Dianalitics
Progress Software Corp
PRGS · v1 · 2026-07-31
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66OpportunityDD: Jul 31, 2026Analyst: 65
paidPrice at analysis date
USD 40.3 (31/07/2026)
domainMkt cap
$1.65B
pie_chartShares
41.01M
candlestick_chart52W
$23.82-$49.88
trending_downShort interest
10.26%
INFONASDAQInformation Technology2801 employeesFounded 1981
Verdict: Moderately Attractive —

Cash-generative software roll-up trading at forward P/E 6.7x and EV/EBITDA 8.9x, with $305M annual FCF (30% margin) and disciplined deleveraging (−$110M debt in H1 2026). Base case FV $50 vs current $40.34 = +24% upside, but capped by high leverage (Debt/EBITDA 4.1x), MOVEit legacy litigation tail, and low organic growth (~4–7%). Domo acquisition (July 2026, $400M) is opportunistic but adds integration risk. Balanced R/R; not a compounder.

📊 DIANALITICS RESEARCH INDEXCompany & Thesis Assessment Score /100 — updated 2026-07-31
65
Progress Software Corp (PRGS)
Infrastructure Software · NASDAQ · Burlington, MA
"Cheap on FCF, hostage to legacy litigation and leverage."
FCF Machine 30% margin Leverage 4.1x EBITDA Fwd P/E 6.7x MOVEit Tail Risk Buyback +3.3% Yield
Fin. strength
12
/20 pts
EBITDA/FCF
13
/15 pts
Debt/leverage
6
/15 pts
Stage/business
13
/15 pts
Catalysts
7
/10 pts
Reg. risk
4
/8 pts
Risk/reward
4
/7 pts
Management
3
/5 pts
Sector/macro
2
/3 pts
Compliance
1
/2 pts
💡 Fair Value Estimate — EV/EBITDA on FY27E, peer-anchored
Fair value base case
USD 50.0
Range: USD 30.0-USD 65.0
Price at analysis date: USD 40.3 (31/07/2026)
Base upside/downside: +24%

Primary method EV/EBITDA on FY27E ($400M EBITDA, 8.5x peer-derived multiple). Implied multiple 8.2x within ±5% of nominal. Cross-check via P/FCF (11x on $305M TTM) reaches $52/sh, within ±5%. Sensitivity: ±1x multiple change = ±$9.75/share (±20% of FV). Weight distribution reflects VALUE profile bias toward downside protection (Bear 30% weight vs 25% neutral) — legacy MOVEit contingent liability + high leverage justify the tilt. ⚠️ Not investment advice.

ComponentAssumptionUSD/share
Core EV (EBITDA multiple)FY27E EBITDA $400M × 8.5x peer-derived multiple = $3,400M EV / 41.0M shares+82.93
Net debt subtraction($1.33B total debt − $103M cash) / 41.0M shares−29.76
Domo integration NPV (option value)60% probability × $200M synergy/PV / 41M shares (deal announced Jul 22, close Nov 2026)+2.93
Buyback tailwind (net of RSU dilution)3.3% net share reduction / y × $305M FCF × 2 yr = $20M value / 41M sh+0.50
MOVEit litigation reserve$60M residual exposure (58 class actions, avg $1M net of settlements) / 41M shares−1.46
FV base caseSum + 1-yr discount at 10% CoE: 55.14 / 1.10 ≈≈ $50.00
Bull
$60–$75
Probability: 20%
Domo integration accretive by FY27, EBITDA hits $430M, multiple re-rates to 10x on AI-platform narrative. Debt/EBITDA falls to <3x, MOVEit fully resolved for <$50M. Buyback accelerates. Consensus PT $53.80 exceeded.
Base
$45–$55
Probability: 50%
Guidance delivery: revenue $995M FY26, EBITDA $370M, non-GAAP EPS $6.15. Domo integration on plan. Debt/EBITDA moves to 3.5x. Litigation resolves within $60M reserve. Multiple stable at 8.5x.
Bear
$25–$35
Probability: 30%
MOVEit yields large adverse ruling ($200M+). Domo integration destroys value (Domo was FCF-negative). Rate rise pressures 4.1x leverage. Revenue growth stalls <3%. Multiple compresses to 6.5x. Covenant scare.
Methodology: Primary method EV/EBITDA on FY27E ($400M EBITDA, 8.5x peer-derived multiple). Implied multiple 8.2x within ±5% of nominal. Cross-check via P/FCF (11x on $305M TTM) reaches $52/sh, within ±5%. Sensitivity: ±1x multiple change = ±$9.75/share (±20% of FV). Weight distribution reflects VALUE profile bias toward downside protection (Bear 30% weight vs 25% neutral) — legacy MOVEit contingent liability + high leverage justify the tilt. ⚠️ Not investment advice. Not investment advice.
⚠️ Methodology note: Enterprise-software roll-up profile — valuation primarily via EV/EBITDA on forward EBITDA vs public peers (OpenText, Teradata, SolarWinds). Balance sheet leverage is material (Debt/EBITDA 4.1x, net debt −$29.84/sh) and requires explicit net debt subtraction line. Q2 2026 results (reported Jun 30) and July 22 Domo deal are the two most recent catalysts shaping the thesis.
📊 Capital Structure · Short Interest · Buyback & Dilution
🟡 Short Interest
10.26%
4.21M shares shorted on 41.0M outstanding. Days to cover: 4.1. Elevated (moderate range 5–15%) — reflects leverage & MOVEit concerns, not distress.
🟢 Share dilution (1Y)
−3.31%
42.4M → 41.0M shares. Active buyback net of RSU issuance. Buyback yield 3.3% at current prices; capital return prioritized alongside deleveraging.
🟢 Buyback
Active
Multi-year repurchase program executing. Priority order: 1) debt paydown ($110M in H1 2026), 2) buyback, 3) M&A (Domo $400M announced Jul 22). No dividend.
Short Interest — context
PRGS — 10.26%
10.26%

10.26% SI with 4.1 days-to-cover is elevated but not squeeze-territory. Reflects skepticism on: (a) MOVEit contingent liabilities, (b) Debt/EBITDA 4.1x limiting flexibility, (c) Domo deal integration risk. Insider selling in 2026 (CFO Folger $132K May 19, CLO Wang $144K May 18, EVP Subramanian ~$405K) all under pre-planned Rule 10b5-1 plans — routine, not signal, but combined amount <$700K over 12 months is not a red flag by itself.

$Financial analysis — FY 2025–2027E
Revenue TTM
$1.00B
+15.5% YoY (FY25 +30%)
EBITDA TTM
$322M
32.0% margin
FCF TTM
$305M
30.4% margin, $7.44/sh
Net Debt
$1.22B
4.13x EBITDA — high
ItemFY2024FY2025FY2026 GuidanceFY2027E
Revenue ($M)753978 (+30%)990–1,0101,050–1,100
Non-GAAP EPS ($)4.915.72 (+16%)6.09–6.216.50–7.00E
EBITDA ($M)245310E360–380400–420 (incl. Domo)
EBITDA margin (%)32.5%31.7%36–38%~38%
FCF ($M)210285310–330340–360
Total Debt ($M)1,5401,4001,200–1,2501,000–1,100
Cash & equiv. ($M)172140~100 (post-Domo)150–200
FY25 growth boosted by ShareFile acquisition (Sep 2024). FY26 guidance raised at Q2 (Jun 30). FY27E reflects full-year Domo ($310M revenue at neutral EBITDA post-integration cost cuts).
Quarterly dynamics — last 5 quarters
MetricQ2 2025Q3 2025Q4 2025Q1 2026Q2 2026
Revenue ($M)236.8247.1246.9247.9253.5
YoY growth %+35%+37%+29%+4%+7%
Non-GAAP EPS ($)1.241.441.511.311.62
Op. margin %36%39%37%36%40%
Adj. FCF ($M)5265787279
Total Debt ($M)1,4701,4301,4001,3401,290
Financial position and sustainability
FCF/Interest coverage
2.66x
Debt/EBITDA (target <3x)
4.13x
Return on Equity
18.57%
Gross Margin
85.57%
FCF Yield vs price
18.74%
account_tree

Business model — Infrastructure Software Roll-up + Data/AI Platform

Enterprise infrastructure software with acquisition-driven growth
Progress operates a portfolio of ~20 mature enterprise software products spanning application development (OpenEdge, Sitefinity, Kendo UI), DevOps/DevSecOps (Chef), data connectivity (DataDirect, MarkLogic), managed file transfer (MOVEit, Automate MFT/ShareFile), and secure communications. Revenue is 85% recurring (maintenance + subscription + SaaS). Growth engine = M&A: Ipswitch (2019), Chef (2020), Kemp (2021), MarkLogic (2023), ShareFile (2024), Domo (2026 pending). Each acquisition follows the same playbook: acquire mid-scale infrastructure asset at 3-4x revenue, retain customers, cut ~25% opex, extract 40% operating margin within 18 months.

Data Platform (AI/RAG) ~$350M FY27E (30% rev) 🟢 ramping MarkLogic + DataDirect + Semaphore + Agentic RAG. Domo acquisition (Nov 2026) doubles capabilities. AI-native positioning. GM 82%. Digital Experience ~$280M FY27E (25% rev) 🟢 stable Sitefinity CMS, Kendo UI, Corticon. Mature, high-margin. Recent Sitefinity Generative CMS launch. GM 88%. Infrastructure Mgmt ~$260M FY27E (23% rev) 🟢 stable Chef DevOps, Kemp LoadMaster (ADC), WhatsUp Gold. Reliable maintenance revenue. GM 84%. Secure File & Collab ~$180M FY27E (16% rev) 🟡 recovering MOVEit, Automate MFT, ShareFile. MOVEit brand damaged post-2023 breach but still core cash generator. Rebuilt security posture. GM 80%. Application Dev (Legacy) ~$60M FY27E (6% rev) 🔴 declining OpenEdge — legacy 4GL. Slow decline offset by maintenance stickiness. Highly profitable but sunset trajectory. Domo (pending) ~$310M FY27E full-year 🟡 to prove $400M cash acquisition ($355M net), close Nov 2026. BI/analytics + AI. Domo was FCF-negative; PRGS expects >25% opex synergies to reach 30%+ EBITDA margin.

gavel

Legal, regulatory and risk analysis

MOVEit class actions & SEC probe
High
58+ class action lawsuits + state/federal/international investigations tied to May 2023 MOVEit breach affecting 62M+ people. Company explicitly states "cannot reasonably estimate a range of possible losses". Individual settlements so far small ($9.95M National Student Clearinghouse, $2.39M Union Bank Apr 2026), but aggregate exposure unquantified. Tail risk of adverse ruling remains material.
Leverage 4.1x Debt/EBITDA
High
$1.33B total debt vs $103M cash. Interest coverage only 2.66x. Altman Z-Score 1.31 (statistically elevated bankruptcy signal, though FCF profile contradicts). Domo cash outflow (~$355M net) reduces near-term flexibility. Rate environment tightening covenants.
Domo integration execution
Moderate
$400M for a FCF-negative asset. PRGS's playbook (25% opex cut → 30% margin in 18 months) is well-proven but Domo is a different business (BI/analytics vs infrastructure). Customer churn during transition, dilutive to margins in first 2 quarters.
Low organic growth
Moderate
3Y revenue growth forecast only 1.37%, 3Y EPS growth 3.32%. Growth pattern is: acquire → digest → acquire again. If M&A pipeline dries up or overpays, model breaks. Recent 15% headline growth is inorganic.
Insider selling patterns
Low
CFO ($132K), CLO ($144K), EVP ($405K) sold in 2026 — all under pre-planned Rule 10b5-1 arrangements. Combined <$700K, small relative to comp. Not a signal in isolation, but worth monitoring if cluster expands.
FCF generation strength
Positive
$305M annual FCF, 30% margin, 18.7% FCF yield. Business converts EBITDA to cash at ~95%. Even in Bear scenario, FCF likely stays above $250M — provides self-funded debt paydown ceiling and buyback support.
Buyback discipline
Positive
Net share count down 3.31% YoY despite active RSU program. 3.31% buyback yield combines with 0% dividend to give shareholder yield of 3.31%. Management prioritizes returning capital when stock is cheap.
Peer-relative valuation
Positive
Fwd P/E 6.7x is the cheapest in peer group (OTEX 6.0x, TDC 7.5x, SWI 14.0x). EV/EBITDA 8.9x TTM at peer median. Valuation offers downside cushion vs typical software multiples of 15-25x.
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SWOT analysis

Strengths
  • +Best-in-class FCF conversion: $305M FCF on $1.00B revenue (30% margin)
  • +Proven M&A integration playbook — 5 major acquisitions in 6 years all margin-accretive
  • +Recurring revenue base ~85% (maintenance/SaaS) providing predictability
  • +Gross margin 85.57%, EBITDA margin 32% — top-quartile software profile
  • +Active buyback with net share reduction 3.31% YoY
Weaknesses
  • Debt/EBITDA 4.13x limits balance sheet flexibility
  • Organic revenue growth only 4-7% — dependent on M&A for headline growth
  • MOVEit brand damage still weighing on cross-sell & new customer acquisition
  • Current ratio 0.81 (working capital negative $80M)
  • Fragmented product portfolio (20+ SKUs) with limited cross-sell synergy
Opportunities
  • Domo close (Nov 2026) — AI/BI capability doubles data platform footprint
  • Agentic RAG launch positions PRGS in the AI infrastructure narrative
  • Continued deleveraging → multiple re-rating if Debt/EBITDA reaches <3x
  • MOVEit litigation resolution removes tail-risk discount from multiple
  • Enterprise software consolidation — PRGS could become target itself at 2.5x rev
Threats
  • !Adverse MOVEit ruling could exceed $200M reserve estimate
  • !Domo integration failure — company was FCF-negative pre-deal
  • !Rate environment squeezing 2.66x interest coverage
  • !Competitive displacement in data platform vs Snowflake/Databricks/Microsoft Fabric
  • !M&A pipeline dry-up would expose slow organic growth (~1-2%)
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Summary by assessment area

🟡 Financial risk — Moderate
  • FCF strength ($305M/y) offsets leverage concerns
  • Debt/EBITDA 4.1x is peak, trending down
  • Interest coverage 2.66x adequate but not comfortable
  • No dividend; capital allocation focused on debt + buyback
🟡 Regulatory/Litigation — Moderate-High
  • MOVEit tail risk unquantified but manageable in base case
  • SEC investigation open — status quo, no new escalation
  • Insider transactions all under 10b5-1 pre-plans
  • Standard enterprise software regulatory environment
🔵 Valuation — Moderately attractive
  • Fwd P/E 6.7x + EV/EBITDA 8.9x = at low end of software peer range
  • Base FV $50 vs $40.34 spot = +24% upside
  • Consensus $53.80, Strong Buy (5 analysts)
  • Not a compounder — a mean-reversion + cash-yield play
Sources & Disclaimer

Sources: Progress Software Q2 2026 Earnings Release (Jun 30, 2026), Q2 2026 Earnings Call Transcript (SeekingAlpha), 8-K filings SEC EDGAR, StockAnalysis.com PRGS statistics (Jul 30, 2026), GuruFocus peer EV/EBITDA (OTEX, TDC, SWI), TheFly analyst notes (DA Davidson, Oppenheimer, Citi), StockTitan SEC filings for insider Form 4 disclosures, Cybersecurity Dive & The Record for MOVEit litigation status, ClassAction.org. Market data — last verified close 2026-07-30: PRGS $40.34, market cap $1.65B, 52W range $23.82–$49.88, shares outstanding 41.01M. Short interest 10.26%. Enterprise value $2.85B. Prezzo usato: $40.34 (close 2026-07-30, T-1) — fonti: StockAnalysis.com (real-time), AAII (article "PRGS Stock Is Down 5.18%" Jul 30 2026). ⚠️ This document is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial or investment advice.