Dianalitics
NuScale Power Corporation
SMR Β· v5 Β· 2026-05-18
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29RiskyDD: May 18, 2026Analyst: 46
paidPrice at analysis date
USD 10.4 (18/05/2026)
domainMkt cap
$3.55B
pie_chartShares
-
candlestick_chart52W
$8.85-$57.42
trending_downShort interest
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MEDIUMNYSEUtilitiesFounded 2007
Verdict: Pre-revenue narrative stock, governance overhang, value depends entirely on TVA conversion

NuScale is the only SMR developer with a US NRC-approved design and ~$1.2B of liquidity β€” but it is pre-commercial: Q1 2026 revenue was $0.6M against ~$70M of quarterly cash burn. The selection factor was [MOMENTUM] (the stock had run sharply before May), but the fundamentals do not support a quality or value thesis: this is a binary, narrative-driven name. A serious governance overhang weighs on it β€” a securities-fraud class action over alleged misrepresentation of commercialization partner ENTRA1's experience. Fair value is not a multiple exercise; it is a probability-weighted call on whether the TVA/ENTRA1 and RoPower projects convert into binding contracts. Base case ~$7.50, below the ~$10.36 price β€” the market still prices meaningful conversion optimism.

πŸ“Š DIANALITICS RESEARCH INDEXCompany & Thesis Assessment Score /100 β€” updated 2026-05-18
46
NuScale Power Corporation (SMR)
Pre-commercial small modular reactor technology Β· NYSE Β· Corvallis, OR
"Regulatory leader with a big cash cushion β€” but pre-revenue, cash-burning, and under a governance cloud. A bet on TVA conversion, not a business yet."
Only NRC-approved SMR design ~$1.2B liquidity, ~no debt Revenue $0.6M Q1 Β· ~$70M/qtr burn Securities-fraud class action Zero binding commercial contracts
Fin. strength
11
/20 pts
EBITDA/FCF
1
/15 pts
Debt/leverage
13
/15 pts
Stage/business
3
/15 pts
Catalysts
6
/10 pts
Reg. risk
3
/8 pts
Risk/reward
3
/7 pts
Management
1
/5 pts
Sector/macro
3
/3 pts
Compliance
2
/5 pts
πŸ’‘ Fair Value Estimate β€” liquidity floor + probability-weighted commercialization option
Fair value base case
USD 7.50
Range: USD 3.00-USD 20.0
Price at analysis date: USD 10.4 (18/05/2026)
Base upside/downside: -28%

Methodology: early-stage / pre-revenue framework β€” no multiple applies. Fair value = liquidity floor (balance-sheet value net of ~12 months of burn) + a probability-weighted commercialization option. The option value is built explicitly as probability Γ— risk-adjusted enterprise value, not chosen to fit a target; the ~25% probability and ~$8.7B conditional EV are the key assumptions and are deliberately conservative given zero binding contracts to date. Litigation and dilution are separate deductions because they are risks the option value does not capture. The headline $7.50 is the arithmetic sum of the table build-up; a probability-weighted scenario blend (~$10.1) is shown as a cross-check and lands higher because the scenario midpoints embed more conversion optimism β€” the more conservative build-up is carried as the base case. Sensitivity is extreme: shifting the conversion probability by Β±10pp moves fair value by roughly Β±$2.4/sh. This is a binary situation β€” position sizing matters more than the point estimate. ⚠️ Not investment advice.

ComponentAssumptionUSD/share
Liquidity floor~$1.2B liquidity (cash + investments, early May) βˆ’ ~$280M next-12m burn = ~$920M / 365.5M sh+2.52
Commercialization option value~25% probability Γ— ~$8.7B risk-adjusted enterprise value if TVA/RoPower convert to binding orders, / 365.5M sh+5.95
Governance / litigation discountclass-action settlement & ongoing credibility drag β€” flat ~$0.70/sh reserve (D. Or. case)βˆ’0.70
Dilution drag (ATM program)ongoing at-the-market equity issuance to fund burn β€” ~$0.27/sh expected dilution over the funding horizonβˆ’0.27
FV base case2.52 + 5.95 βˆ’ 0.70 βˆ’ 0.27 = 7.50β‰ˆ $7.50
Bull
$15–20
Probability: 30%
ENTRA1/TVA sign a definitive PPA for the 6 GW program; RoPower advances with financing secured. Binding orders validate the commercialization path and the option value re-rates sharply.
Base
$7–10
Probability: 45%
Projects keep advancing but without binding contracts in the next 12 months. The stock trades on liquidity plus discounted optionality; the ENTRA1 overhang lingers; ATM dilution continues.
Bear
$3–5
Probability: 25%
TVA/ENTRA1 stalls or collapses, the class action produces a material settlement, burn continues with no revenue. The stock converges toward the liquidity floor as the option value erodes.
Methodology: Methodology: early-stage / pre-revenue framework β€” no multiple applies. Fair value = liquidity floor (balance-sheet value net of ~12 months of burn) + a probability-weighted commercialization option. The option value is built explicitly as probability Γ— risk-adjusted enterprise value, not chosen to fit a target; the ~25% probability and ~$8.7B conditional EV are the key assumptions and are deliberately conservative given zero binding contracts to date. Litigation and dilution are separate deductions because they are risks the option value does not capture. The headline $7.50 is the arithmetic sum of the table build-up; a probability-weighted scenario blend (~$10.1) is shown as a cross-check and lands higher because the scenario midpoints embed more conversion optimism β€” the more conservative build-up is carried as the base case. Sensitivity is extreme: shifting the conversion probability by Β±10pp moves fair value by roughly Β±$2.4/sh. This is a binary situation β€” position sizing matters more than the point estimate. ⚠️ Not investment advice. Not investment advice.
warning
⚠️ Active securities-fraud class action + pre-revenue cash burn
NuScale faces a securities-fraud class action (D. Or., consolidated; lead-plaintiff deadline was April 20, 2026) alleging it misrepresented the experience and capabilities of ENTRA1 Energy β€” its exclusive commercialization partner β€” and the related deployment risks. The trigger: a ~$495M Q3 2025 milestone payment to ENTRA1 that drove G&A expense up >3,000% and a ~$532M quarterly net loss. A Guggenheim report described ENTRA1 as a 3-year-old entity with "3 employees and 1 investor." Separately, the company is pre-commercial β€” Q1 2026 revenue $0.6M, quarterly burn ~$70M β€” and funds operations partly through an at-the-market equity program (ongoing dilution). This is a high-risk, binary situation; sizing and risk control matter more than the upside narrative.
Methodology note β€” NuScale is a pre-commercial "narrative" company: it has essentially no recurring revenue, so earnings-based or revenue-multiple valuation is not meaningful. This report values SMR as an early-stage situation: a liquidity (cash) floor plus a probability-weighted option value on commercialization. The scenario spread is deliberately very wide because the outcome is binary.
πŸ“Š Capital Structure Β· Short Interest Β· Buyback & Dilution
🟑 Short Interest
elevated
SMR is widely described as a "battleground" / crowded-short name; precise current short % not confirmed from a primary source β€” treat as elevated. High beta (~3+) and headline-driven volatility.
πŸ”΄ Share dilution (1Y)
significant
Class A weighted shares rose from ~128M (Q1'25) to ~320M (Q1'26). Ongoing 2026 ATM program: $37.3M raised in Q1, up to ~$962M of further Class A capacity available β€” structural dilution.
🟒 Buyback
$0
No buyback β€” appropriate for a pre-revenue company. Capital is being raised, not returned. Fluor, a legacy strategic holder, fully exited its ~40M-share stake (~$2.43B) during 2025.
Liquidity runway β€” the real balance-sheet story
Liquidity ~$1.2B vs ~$280M annual burn
~4 yrs

The balance sheet is the genuine strength: ~$1.2B of liquidity (cash, equivalents and investments) at early May 2026, essentially no financial debt (~$5.7M). At a core operating burn of ~$70M per quarter, that is roughly four years of runway β€” enough to survive a long pre-commercial phase without an imminent funding cliff. Caveats: the Q1 figure was distorted by a one-time $259.9M milestone payment to ENTRA1 (operating cash outflow hit $314.7M in the quarter); and the ATM equity program means dilution, not debt, is the funding mechanism. Insider activity: third-party data services flagged large insider sell figures over recent months β€” these appear to be dominated by Fluor's complete strategic exit (a legacy holder, ~$2.43B sold since Sept 2025), not routine management selling, but the headline figure should be read with that context.

$Financial analysis β€” FY2026
Revenue (Q1 2026)
$0.6M
βˆ’96% YoY Β· ~89% below estimate
Net loss (Q1 2026)
$46.7M
vs $30.4M loss Q1 2025
Liquidity (early May)
~$1.2B
~no financial debt
Quarterly cash burn
~$70M
core operating, ex one-offs
ItemFY2023FY2024FY2025Q1 2026Outlook
Revenue$22.8M$37.0M$31.5M$0.6MN/D β€” no guidance, pre-commercial
Loss from operationsβˆ’$275.6Mβˆ’$138.7Mβˆ’$689.6M*βˆ’$57.5Mlosses continue
Net loss (total)βˆ’$180.1Mβˆ’$348.4Mβˆ’$664.5M*βˆ’$46.7Mlosses continue
Net loss attrib. Class Aβˆ’$58.4Mβˆ’$136.6Mβˆ’$355.8Mβˆ’$44.0Mβ€”
Cash + investments~$0.3B~$0.45B~$1.25B~$1.0B~$1.2B early May
*FY2025 loss includes the ~$495M Q3 milestone payment to ENTRA1, which pushed G&A expense to ~$610M for the year (from ~$76M in FY2024). FY2023/24 cash figures are approximate. Revenue is lumpy and project-timing driven β€” not a recurring base.
Quarterly dynamics β€” last 5 quarters
MetricQ1 2025Q2 2025Q3 2025Q4 2025Q1 2026
Revenue ($M)13.4~9~6~30.6
Net loss ($M)βˆ’30.4~βˆ’55βˆ’532*~βˆ’47βˆ’46.7
Cash + investments ($M)~430~400~1,150~1,254~1,009
*Q3 2025 net loss of ~$532M reflects the one-time $495M ENTRA1 milestone payment. Quarterly figures other than Q1'25, Q3'25 and Q1'26 are approximate, reconstructed from reported trends. The revenue line shows the structural problem: it is shrinking toward zero as legacy licensing/FEED work concludes and no commercial sales have replaced it.
Financial position and sustainability
Liquidity runway (years at current burn)
~4 yrs
Recurring revenue base
~none
Binding commercial contracts
0
Class A share count growth (1Y)
~+150%
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Business model β€” small modular reactor technology developer

A regulatory leader still searching for its first commercial sale
NuScale develops the NuScale Power Module (NPM) β€” a small, factory-built pressurized-water nuclear reactor generating 77 MWe per module, scalable to ~924 MWe in a VOYGR plant. Its key asset is regulatory: it is the first and only SMR developer with a US NRC-approved design (50 MWe and 77 MWe variants). The intended model is to license the technology and supply modules, while strategic partner ENTRA1 Energy handles plant development, financing and operation. The problem: the model is unproven commercially. Revenue today comes only from licensing and engineering work that is winding down, and no binding orders for modules exist yet.

TVA / ENTRA1 program up to 6 GW β€” in negotiation 🟑 no binding PPA yet ENTRA1's discussions with the Tennessee Valley Authority for what would be the largest US nuclear deployment program. Management says talks "advance well" but there is no definitive PPA and no committed financing. This is the central value driver β€” and entirely contingent. RoPower (Romania) 6 modules β€” pre-EPC 🟑 financing pending Six-NPM plant at a former coal site in DoiceΘ™ti. Romanian government granted investment approval and Nuclearelectrica shareholders voted to proceed; Fluor leads EPC. Still pre-financing, pre-construction. Supply chain & licensing winding down (~$0.6M Q1 rev.) πŸ”΄ legacy revenue fading Framatome (fuel) and Doosan Enerbility (module manufacturing) partnerships; long-lead materials in production. Historic licensing/FEED revenue is essentially exhausted, leaving the income statement near zero.

The tailwind β€” and the catch
The macro backdrop is genuinely favourable: surging electricity demand from data centres and AI, policy support for nuclear, and international funding frameworks (a $550B US–Japan framework, a $350B South Korea initiative) that could finance large baseload projects. NuScale's NRC approval is a real, scarce moat. But none of this is revenue until a counterparty signs a binding contract β€” and the entire commercialization chain currently runs through ENTRA1, the very partner whose credibility is the subject of the class action.
gavel

Legal, regulatory and risk analysis

Securities-fraud class action
Critical
Consolidated class action (D. Or.) alleging misrepresentation of ENTRA1's experience. Strikes at the credibility of the commercialization story itself, not just the balance sheet. Potential settlement cost plus lasting reputational drag.
No commercial revenue / binary outcome
Critical
Q1 revenue $0.6M, zero binding module orders. The investment case rests entirely on converting TVA/RoPower into contracts. If conversion fails, the equity converges toward the cash floor.
ENTRA1 dependency & capital allocation
High
Commercialization runs through a single partner described by Guggenheim as a 3-employee entity. The ~$495M milestone payment raised hard questions about due diligence and capital allocation.
Ongoing dilution (ATM program)
High
Operations funded partly by at-the-market equity sales; up to ~$962M of further Class A issuance capacity. Class A share count more than doubled YoY β€” existing holders are diluted continuously.
Cash burn vs no revenue
Moderate
~$70M/quarter core burn. The ~4-year runway is comfortable for now, but every quarter without a contract erodes both cash and credibility.
Extreme share-price volatility
Moderate
Beta ~3+, 52-week range $8.85–$57.42. A headline-driven "battleground" stock; large swings in both directions are routine and sizing must reflect that.
Balance-sheet strength
Positive
~$1.2B liquidity, essentially no financial debt, ~4-year runway. No imminent funding cliff β€” the company can survive a long pre-commercial phase.
Regulatory moat & macro tailwind
Positive
Only NRC-approved SMR design β€” a scarce, hard-to-replicate asset. Surging AI/data-centre power demand and policy support give the long-term thesis genuine substance, if execution follows.
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SWOT analysis

Strengths
  • +Only SMR developer with a US NRC-approved design (50 & 77 MWe)
  • +~$1.2B liquidity, essentially no financial debt, ~4-year runway
  • +Established supply chain (Framatome, Doosan Enerbility)
  • +Uses widely available low-enriched uranium (no HALEU dependency)
Weaknesses
  • βˆ’Pre-revenue: Q1 revenue $0.6M, no binding module orders
  • βˆ’~$70M/quarter cash burn, funded by dilutive ATM equity
  • βˆ’Commercialization fully dependent on partner ENTRA1
  • βˆ’Securities-fraud class action damaging credibility
Opportunities
  • β†’TVA 6 GW program β€” a transformational order if signed
  • β†’AI / data-centre power demand surge; behind-the-meter siting
  • β†’International funding frameworks (US–Japan, South Korea)
  • β†’RoPower and other international deployments
Threats
  • !TVA/ENTRA1 talks stall or collapse β€” option value erodes
  • !Class action produces a material settlement
  • !Competition from other SMR developers (Oklo, X-energy, etc.)
  • !SMR cost-competitiveness vs other power sources unproven at scale
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Summary by assessment area

🟑 Financial risk β€” MIXED
  • Strong: ~$1.2B liquidity, no debt, ~4-yr runway
  • Weak: $0.6M revenue, ~$70M/qtr burn
  • Continuous ATM dilution to fund operations
πŸ”΄ Business risk β€” HIGH
  • Pre-commercial, zero binding orders
  • Entire thesis hinges on TVA conversion
  • Single-partner (ENTRA1) dependency
πŸ”΄ Valuation / R-R β€” UNFAVORABLE
  • FV ~$7.50 vs price ~$10.36 β€” ~28% downside
  • Binary outcome; bear case ~$3–5 (cash floor)
  • Governance overhang caps the risk/reward
Sources & Disclaimer

Sources: NuScale Power Q1 2026 earnings release, 8-K and 10-Q (May 7, 2026); Q1 2026 earnings call transcript; FY2025 results (Feb 26, 2026); SEC filings. Market data (close May 18, 2026, cross-checked across Robinhood and Motley Fool): SMR ~$10.36, market cap ~$3.55B, 52-week range $8.85–$57.42. Shares: 346.1M Class A + 19.4M Class B = ~365.5M total economic shares (April 30, 2026); ~352.6M fully diluted at March 31, 2026. Liquidity ~$1.0B at March 31, ~$1.2B early May (cash, equivalents and investments); financial debt ~$5.7M. Litigation: consolidated securities-fraud class action (D. Or.) over alleged misrepresentation of partner ENTRA1; lead-plaintiff deadline April 20, 2026. Analyst targets range Citi $7 (Sell) to Northland $19 (Outperform), average ~$16.5, consensus rating "Hold" (May 2026). Some quarterly figures are approximate, reconstructed from reported trends. This document is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial or investment advice.