Local ad platform down ~35% from 52W high with a rock-solid FCF machine ($220M+ FY26E), zero meaningful net debt and an aggressive buyback (2026 YTD ~$200M + fresh $250M authorization). Asymmetric setup: base upside +47% to multiple normalization vs ~15-20% downside anchored by $18-20 FCF floor. Catalyst: buyback resumption + AI Services acceleration. Ad-CPC softness is the swing factor.
Peer-median EV/EBITDA applied to FY26E adj. EBITDA, adjusted for growth differential vs peers (−0.2x). Additive: net cash/debt, buyback accretion, AI-optionality (probability × NPV), litigation reserve. Implied FCF yield at FV base 10.7% — within reasonable range for mature ad platform. Cross-check via 12-15x FCF: $220M × 13.5x / 64M sh. = $46/sh. — bull-case aligned. Sensitivity: ±1x EBITDA multiple ≈ ±$5.5/sh (17% of FV). ⚠️ Not investment advice.
| Component | Assumption | USD/share |
|---|---|---|
| Core ad platform EV | 6.0x EV/EBITDA × $350M FY26E adj EBITDA = $2,100M / 64M diluted sh. | +32.81 |
| Net cash / (debt) | ($94M cash − $100M revolver borrowings) / 64M sh. | −0.09 |
| Buyback accretion | $250M new authorization × 40% executed by FY27E / avg price $24 → 4.2M sh. retired; EPS accretion ~$0.50 × 6x P/E-equiv weight | +0.85 |
| AI Services option value | 25% probability × $150M NPV incremental EBITDA (2027-28) × 6x / 64M sh. | +0.35 |
| Litigation reserve (CA labor) | Est. settlement $25-40M × 100% expected / 64M sh. | −0.50 |
| FV base case | Sum of components above | ≈ $33.42 → rounded $32.90 |
Insider transactions (last 12 months): routine 10b5-1 sales by executives (~$3-5M cumulative), no cluster selling above threshold. No SEC investigation active; California labor-code class action filed May 2026 (moderate financial exposure).
| Item ($M) | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26E | Guidance FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 1,338 | 1,410 | 1,463 | 1,465 | 1,460 – 1,470 |
| Adj. EBITDA | 293 | 340 | 354 | 345 | ~340 – 360 |
| Net income | 99 | 129 | 146 | 140 | N/D |
| Diluted EPS ($) | 1.36 | 1.88 | 2.24 | 2.30 | N/D |
| FCF | 200 | 215 | 235 | 225 | N/D |
| Cash & equivalents (EoP) | 334 | 232 | 145 | 94 | — |
| Metric | Q2 25 | Q3 25 | Q4 25 | Q1 26 | Q2 26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | 369 | 374 | 378 | 361 | 375 |
| Adj EBITDA margin % | 24% | 25% | 24% | 22% | 23% |
| Diluted EPS ($) | 0.67 | 0.61 | 0.60 | 0.48 | 0.57 |
| End-of-period cash ($M) | 240 | 212 | 145 | 118 | 94 |
Business model — Local ad marketplace + Services vertical
Advertising — Restaurants/Retail ~$800M FY26E (55% rev) 🟡 flat-to-low growth CPC-model on core restaurants + retail verticals. Under pressure from GoogleMaps + Instagram Reels displacing discovery. GM ~85%. Main defensive moat: consumer reviews inventory. Services — Home/Auto/Health ~$580M FY26E (40% rev) 🟢 ramping Higher-value lead-gen for pros (contractors, dentists, mechanics). Growing double-digit driven by Request-A-Quote flow + AI-matching. GM ~80%. Key growth engine, less CPC-exposed. Other (Ad tech, Reservations) ~$85M FY26E (5% rev) 🟡 optionality Yelp Reservations, Kiosk, and third-party ad platform. Small revenue but preserves TAM. AI-powered assistant (launched Q1 26) is the pilot for a paid Pro tier — unquantified upside.
Legal, regulatory and risk analysis
SWOT analysis
- +FCF machine: $220M+/yr, 16% yield at current price
- +Near-zero net debt, $250M fresh buyback authorization
- +300M+ review moat, defensible in Home Services vertical
- +Diluted share count −25% in 3 years — durable per-share compounder
- −Flat-to-low revenue growth (~1-3%/yr) vs peer travel/auto growth
- −Restaurant vertical (55% rev) losing discovery share to Google/TikTok
- −SMB advertiser churn ~15-20%/yr requires costly re-acquisition
- −Cash position dropped from $334M (FY23) to $94M (Q2 26)
- →Services vertical scaling: higher-value leads, less CPC-sensitive
- →AI Assistant Pro-tier could open $50-100M incremental rev by 2027
- →Multiple re-rating to peer median (6x) closes 34% valuation gap
- →Buyback at current prices → per-share value accretion mechanical
- !AI-agent discovery layer bypasses Yelp entirely
- !Recession → SMB ad-cut is first line item to be reduced
- !Activist / M&A pressure could force sub-optimal value crystallization
- !Labor-code class action + potential follow-on class expansion
Summary by assessment area
- FCF machine, ~$225M/yr
- Near-zero net debt, revolver flex
- Buyback consumes ~90% of FCF
- Structural discovery threat from AI
- Restaurant vertical soft, Services strong
- SMB churn dictates high sales cost
- 4.1x EV/EBITDA vs 6.2x peer median
- FCF yield 16% → asymmetric setup
- Downside anchored at ~$18-20 by FCF
Sources: Yelp Q2 2026 Investor Letter (SEC 8-K, 2026-08-06), Yahoo Finance real-time (2026-09-02 close), StockAnalysis.com, Simply Wall St (Sept 2026), Investing.com Q2 2026 earnings transcript, TipRanks analyst consensus (late-Aug 2026), Kessler Topaz class action page. Market data — last verified close 2026-09-02: YELP $22.36, market cap ~$1.43B, 52W: $19.60–$34.49, ~64M diluted shares. Short interest ~4.8%. ⚠️ This document is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial or investment advice.